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LAW AND THE POLITICS OF MARRIAGE:
LOVING v. VIRGINIA AFTER 30 YEARS
INTRODUCTION
Robert A. Destro *
Just over 30 years ago, it was a crime for interracial couples in Virginia
to marry, or to live as husband and wife.1 The Supreme Court's decision
. Professor, The Catholic University of America, Columbus School of Law. B.A., 1972
Miami University; J.D., 1975, University of California, Berkeley; Associate Attorney,
Squire, Sanders & Dempsey, Ohio, 1975-77; General Counsel, Catholic League for Relig-
ious and Civil Rights, 1977-81; Adjunct Assistant Professor, 1978-80, Adjunct Associate
Professor, 1980-82, Marquette University; Columbus School of Law since 1982; Commis-
sioner, United States Civil Rights Commission, 1983-89.
1. The two statutes under which Mr. and Mrs. Loving were convicted were part of a
comprehensive statutory scheme designed to prohibit and punish interracial marriages.
Section 20-58 of the Code of Virginia (1960) provided:
Leaving State to evade law.-If any white person and colored person shall go out
of this State, for the purpose of being married, and with the intention of return-
ing, and be married out of it, and afterwards return to and reside in it, cohabiting
as man and wife, they shall be punished as provided in § 20-59, and the marriage
shall be governed by the same law as if it had been solemnized in this State. The
fact of their cohabitation here as man and wife shall be evidence of their mar-
riage.
Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 4 (1967). Section 20-59 defined the penalty for miscegena-
tion:
"Punishment for marriage. -f any white person intermarry with a colored person, or
any colored person intermarry with a white person, he shall be guilty of a felony and shall
be punished by confinement in the penitentiary for not less than one nor more than five
years." Id. Other provisions in Virginia's statutory scheme were § 20-57, which automati-
cally voided all marriages between 'a white person and a colored person.' No judicial pro-
ceeding was necessary. Sections 20-54 and 1-14, respectively, which defined 'white per-
sons,' 'colored persons and Indians':
Intermarriage prohibited; meaning of term 'white persons. '-It shall hereafter be
unlawful for any white person in this State to marry any save a white person, or a
person with no other admixture of blood than white and American Indian. For
the purpose of this chapter, the term 'white person' shall apply only to such per-
son as has no trace whatever of any blood other than Caucasian; but persons who
have one-sixteenth or less of the blood of the American Indian and have no other
non-Caucasic blood shall be deemed to be white persons. All laws heretofore
passed and now in effect regarding the intermarriage of white and colored per-
sons shall apply to marriages prohibited by this chapter. Code of Virginia § 20-
54 (1960 Repl. Vol.).
Id. at 4-5 & n.4.
Section 1-14 of the Code of Virginia provided:
Colored persons and Indians defined.-Every person in whom there is ascertain-
1207
Catholic University Law Review
in Loving v. Virginia' put an end to that, and invalidated the anti-
miscegenation laws in force in fifteen other states? In the process, the
Court repudiated the eugenic racism embodied in the statute, describing
it as "odious to a free people whose institutions are founded upon the
doctrine of equality."4 Loving also affirms the abiding importance of the
marriage relationship to the marriage partners, to families, and to society
as a whole.
Given the importance of Loving in American constitutional law, we
were somewhat surprised to learn that no commemorative conferences
or symposia had been planned to mark the thirtieth anniversary of the
decision. We designed our conference, "Law and the Politics of Mar-
riage: Loving v. Virginia After 30 Years," to fill that gap.
The conference was held at The Catholic University of America's Co-
lumbus School of Law, 19-21 November 1997, and was co-sponsored by
three institutions, each having a unique and abiding interest in the sub-
ject matter: The Catholic University of America, the Howard University
School of Law, and the J. Reuben Clark School of Law at Brigham
Young University.
The goal of the conference, and of the papers it encouraged, was to
explore the implications of the Loving decision for Mr. and Mrs. Loving,
for the United States in the late 1960s, and for American family and con-
stitutional law today and in the future. This issue of the Catholic Univer-
sity Law Review contains some of the papers presented at that confer-
able any Negro blood shall be deemed and taken to be a colored person, and
every person not a colored person having one fourth or more of American Indian
blood shall be deemed an American Indian; except that members of Indian tribes
existing in this Commonwealth having one fourth or more of Indian blood and
less than one sixteenth of Negro blood shall be deemed tribal Indians. Va. Code
Ann. §1 - 14 (1960 Repl. Vol.).
Id. at 5 n. 4.
2. 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
3. See id. at 6 n.5. The following state constitutional and statutory provisions were
invalidated: Alabama, ALA. CONST., art. 4, § 102, ALA. CODE, tit. 14, § 360 (1958); Ar-
kansas, ARK. STAT. ANN. § 55-104 (1947); Delaware, DEL. CODE ANN., tit. 13, § 101
(1953); Florida, FLA. CONST., art. 16, § 24, FLA. STAT. § 741.11 (1965); Georgia, GA.
CODE ANN. § 53-106 (1961); Kentucky, KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 402.020 (Supp. 1966);
Louisiana, LA. REV. STAT. § 14:79 (1950); Mississippi, Miss. CONST., ART. 14, § 263,
MISS. CODE ANN. § 459 (1956); Missouri, MO. REV. STAT. § 451.020 (Supp. 1966); North
Carolina, N.C. CONST., Art. XIV, § 8, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-181 (1953); Oklahoma,
OKLA. STAT., tit. 43, § 12 (Supp. 1965); South Carolina, S.C. CONST., art. 3, § 33, S.C.
CODE ANN. § 20-7 (1962); Tennessee, TENN. CONST., art. 11, § 14, TENN. CODE ANN. §
36-402 (1955); Texas, TEX. PEN. CODE, art. 492 (1952); West Virginia, W.VA. CODE §
4697 (1961).
Id.
4. Id at 11.
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ence. Others are printed in Volume 12 of the Brigham Young University
Journal of Public Law, and Volume 41 of the Howard University Law
Journal. Read together, they shed considerable light on the history, sig-
nificance, and contemporary understanding of the Court's decision in
Loving.
I. THE IMPORTANCE OF LOVING AS PRECEDENT
Loving v. Virginia is, by any definition, a landmark case. Depending on
who is reading it-and for what purpose-the case can be characterized
as a "race" case, a "eugenics" case, a "marriage" case, or a "substantive
due process" case. Given the importance of Loving in contemporary de-
bates over the law of marriage and family, it is appropriate to begin with
a brief discussion of the basis for each possible characterization and then
turn to a brief examination of the way in which each possible characteri-
zation of the case might affect our understanding of its importance.
First, however, a brief word about the process of "characterization" is
in order.
A. Characterization as a Process
1. Characterization in General
Characterization is the process by which a case is classified or catego-
rized for purposes of legal analysis.' Lawyers engage in the practice each
time they utilize alternative legal theories in pleading the facts of a case.
By choosing from among a range of alternative analytical categories,
("categorical" analysis),6 judges and Justices engage in the same process.
By choosing the appropriate category, they can select the rule to govern
the decision of a case.
British scholars Peter North and J.J. Fawcett provide a good descrip-
tion of the process:'
5. For purposes of this essay, the terms "characterization," "classification," and
"categorization" are synonymous.
6. Recent interpretive disputes among the Justices of the Supreme Court have con-
tributed to an increase in the amount of attention given the subject by constitutional
scholars. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Two Senses of Autonomy, 46 STAN. L. REV. 875
(1994); Stephen E. Gottlieb, The Paradox Of Balancing Significant Interests, 45 HASTINGS
L.J. 825 (1994); Timothy L. Hall, Religion, Equality, and Difference, 65 TEMP. L. REV. 1
(1992); Frederick Schauer, A Comment On The Structure Of Rights, 27 GA. L. REV. 415
(1993); Matthew S. Steffey, Separable Principles Of Equality, Subsidy, Endorsement, and
Church Autonomy, 75 MARO. L. REV. 903 (1992); Kathleen M. Sullivan, Post-Liberal
Judging: The Roles of Categorization and Balancing, 63 U. COLO. L. REV. 293 (1992).
7. The most extensive literature on the process of characterization is found in the
1998] 1209
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What is meant by the "classification of the cause of action" is
the allocation of the question raised by the factual situation be-
fore the court to its correct legal category, and its object is to
reveal the relevant rule for the choice of [the applicable] law.
The rules of any given system of law are arranged under differ-
ent categories, some being concerned with status, others with
succession, procedure, tort and so on, and until a judge, faced
with a case involving a foreign element, has determined the par-
ticular category into which the question before him falls, he can
make no progress, for he will not know what ... rule to apply.
He must discover the true basis of the ... claim.8
In a products liability case, for example, it is possible to characterize
the legal issues as arising in tort, contract, and insurance. By choosing the
category for analysis, the judge chooses the body of law that will govern
the outcome of the case. This body of law will supply the "rule of deci-
sion." Application of the rule of decision to the facts of the case will sup-
ply the "holding," or "rule of the case."
In most cases, the analytical category and applicable norm(s) are clear.
In cases where there is a possibility of multiple characterizations, the
most common approach is to analyze the facts under each one, and to
decide the case accordingly.
Occasionally, however, the matter is far from simple. In the first
place, it may be a case near the line in which it is difficult to de-
termine whether the question falls naturally within this or that
judicial category. Secondly, it may be a case where [different ju-
rists or systems] hold diametrically opposed views on the cor-
rect classification. There may, in other words, be a conflict of
classification. . . . The crucial question, therefore, is-on what
principles do... judges classify the cause of action? 9
When there is a conflict of characterization, or when important differ-
ential policy outcomes attach to the choice of category, the determina-
tion of the "appropriate" characterization is, itself, a policy question of
the highest order. A judge or Justice confronting a set of facts that per-
mits alternative characterizations must choose the "controlling" norm (or
norms) from a range of equally plausible alternatives. This is, at least in
part, the essence of "judgment."
field of conflict of laws. See generally PETER M. NORTH & J.J. FAWCETr, CHESHIRE &
NORTH'S PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 43-52 (12th ed. 1992); SYMEON C.
SYMEONIDES ET AL., CONFLICT OF LAWS: AMERICAN, COMPARATIVE,
INTERNATIONAL 40-67 (1998) (describing the traditional American approach in conflicts
cases).
8. NORTH & FAWCETr, supra note 7, at 44.
9. Id. at 44-45.
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Unfortunately, judges do not generally give reasons for the rule-
selection aspects of their judgment." In many cases, the rule-selection
implicit in characterization is simply a fait accompli." To the extent that
there are principles that govern the process," the approach of a particular
court, judge, or Justice may be discernable only from a study of series of
decisions.
Over time, a pattern of characterization choices will reveal a consider-
able amount of information about a court or jurist's views for future
cases having similar facts. It also will provide considerable information
concerning the court's views on the role of the judiciary in ensuring the
orderly development of the law.
2. Characterization in American Constitutional Law
In American constitutional law, the question - On what principles do
10. In The Paradox of Balancing Significant Interests, Professor Stephen E. Gottlieb
notes that leaving the reasons for the choice of method unstated is understandable, for
three reasons:
First, the methods are not often determinative. Second, the methods can often
be translated into one another. Third.... the dispute is miscast because the deci-
sion between balancing and not balancing is illusory. The only "real" decisions
are when intuitive judgments, whether described as balancing or otherwise,
should be allowed to enter the analysis, which assumptions should be articulated,
and which should be left inchoate.
Gottlieb, supra note 6, at 838.
11. Sometimes the parties will select the rules. This can be done by artful (or shoddy)
pleading, by agreement (as in a choice of law clause in a contract), or by simple inadver-
tence (as in an uninformed choice of forum). The focus of this essay is on situations in
which the judge chooses from a range of plausible alternatives.
12. Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, in A Constitution of Democratic Experi-
mentalism, note that
[Tihe categorization of particular cases as calling for either deference or close
scrutiny is, at best, a political makeshift. It demonstrates to the polity that the
Court is aware of its place in the constitutional order, even if by a sad paradox
each decision taken by itself seems to suggest that it is not, and even if, by a more
perilous paradox, the balancing act underscores just how much that order de-
pends on the Court's ability to maintain its poise. Indeed, on rare occasions we
actually see the Court teetering. It worries that the application of a standard in a
particular case will undermine the integrity of the standard in others. The Court's
falterings reveal its fundamental dilemma. For if the Court abandons deference
too often for the alternatives of heightened scrutiny or hard look review, and in
the bargain recognizes openly that it is engaged in balancing incommensurate
public and private goods, it interferes with the political process and risks its own
legitimacy. But if the Court chooses deference instead, it risks protecting itself at
the cost of the fundamental values it is meant to safeguard.
98 COLUM. L. REV. 267, 394-95 (1998); see also Dennis W. Arrow, Pomobabble: Postmod-
ern Newspeak and Constitutional "Meaning" for the Uninitiated, 96 MICH. L. REV. 461
(1997).
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judges classify causes of action?- generally has been subsumed within the
much larger topic of judicial review. This result is unfortunate. Charac-
terization is a critically important component of constitutional analysis. 3
When a constitutional case can be characterized in more than one way,
the choice of the "appropriate" category has an enormous impact. It will
determine the applicable constitutional norm (rule of decision), the ana-
lytical framework utilized in the factual inquiry, and the meaning of the
precedent. 4
Just as in other fields of law, sometimes the character of the action is
obvious. (e.g., a state regulation of interstate commerce that is in direct
conflict with congressional policy on the same subject). In cases such as
these, the choice of the applicable category resolves the case."
Categorization is the taxonomist's style-a job of classification
and labeling. When categorical formulas operate, all the impor-
tant work in litigation is done at the outset. Once the relevant
right and mode of infringement have been described, the out-
come follows, without any explicit judicial balancing of the
claimed right against the government's justification for the in-
fringement.
In other cases, there may be alternative modes of analysis, and the
choice made will give important clues concerning the policy perspectives
of the Court.
3. The Role of Characterization in Loving
Viewed from a perspective that recognizes the connection between
characterization and rule-selection, Loving is a paradigm case. Though
all the Justices agreed that Virginia's statute was unconstitutional, they
13. The Court has been very clear on this point. In Colorado Republican Federal
Campaign Committee v. Federal Election Commission, for example, the Court stated that
it was "not bound to decide a matter of constitutional law based on a concession by the
particular party before the Court as to the proper legal characterization of the facts." 518
U.S. 604, 622 (1996); see also Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229, 235-238 (1963)
(holding that the State may not avoid First Amendment's strictures by applying the label
"breach of the peace" to peaceful demonstrations); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 429
(1963) (reasoning that the government "cannot foreclose the exercise of constitutional
rights by mere labels").
14. In Young v. United States, it gave the reason: "[O]ur judgments are precedents,"
and the proper understanding of matters of law "cannot be left merely to the stipulation of
parties". 315 U.S. 257, 259 (1942).
15. See generally Laurence H. Tribe & Michael C. Dorf, Levels of Generality in the
Definition of Rights, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 1057 (1990); Brent E. Marshall, Note, The Unseen
Regulator: The Role of Characterization in First Amendment Free Exercise Cases, 59
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 978 (1984).
16. Sullivan, supra note 6, at 293.
1212 [Vol. 47:1207
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disagreed on two key points: 1) which constitutional norms were applica-
ble under the circumstances; and 2) the appropriate formulation of the
rule(s) of decision.
Justice Stewart's concurring opinion in Loving is both short and to the
point. Since the words of the statute "ma[de] the criminality of an act de-
pend upon the race of the actor,"'7 Justice Stewart classified the cause of
action as a race-based equal protection claim.
Given that characterization, Loving was an easy case. By limiting the
analytical category to race, Justice Stewart focuses the reader's attention
on the rule of decision in race cases. In his view, the applicable rule of
decision was stated in McLaughlin v. Florida."8
McLaughlin involved an appeal from a conviction under a Florida
statute that made it a crime for "a white person and a Negro [to] habitu-
ally occupy the same room at nighttime."'9 Insofar as the state law was
concerned, the Florida law involved in McLaughlin was identical to the
Virginia law at issue in Loving. Both "ma[de] the criminality of an act
depend upon the race of the actor."
The facts of the two cases, however, were different. The defendants in
the Florida case, Mr. McLaughlin and Ms. Hoffman, were not husband
and wife. The Lovings were married.
For the majority in Loving, this distinction was important enough to
warrant recognition of a separate analytical category: "the right to
marry." For Justice Stewart in Loving, the marital status of the parties
was irrelevant, given his categorization of the case as a race-based equal
protection claim.
This raises an important question: What factors influenced the Court's
characterization of the legal questions presented in Loving?
The answer appears to reside in an ongoing debate within the Court
concerning the appropriate standard of review for cases alleging dis-
crimination "on the basis of race." Unlike Justice Stewart, the majority in
Loving was unwilling to hold that the Equal Protection Clause operates
as a categorical negative on race-based laws. Following its traditional ap-
proach, the majority opinion by Chief Justice Warren stated that statutes
containing racial classifications are subject to a "very heavy burden of
justification."
Balancing is more like grocer's work (or Justice's) [than
17. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 13 (1967) (Stewart, J., concurring in the judgment)
(citation omitted).
18. 379 U.S. 184 (1964).
19. 379 U.S. at 186 (quoting § 798.05 of the Florida Statutes).
19981 1213
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characterization] - the judge's job is to place competing rights
and interests on a scale and weigh them against each other.
Here the outcome is not determined at the outset, but depends
on the relative strength of a multitude of factors.0
The Court thus entertained at least the theoretical possibility that a
State might, in some future case, be able to make such a showing."
Justice Stewart took a dim view of the Court's "balancing" approach,
and castigated the majority for attempting to maintain flexibility on mat-
ter where he believed that there should have been a categorical rule.
I concur in the judgment and agree with most of what is said in
the Court's opinion. But the Court implies that a criminal law of
the kind here involved might be constitutionally valid if a State
could show "some overriding statutory purpose." This is an im-
plication in which I cannot join, because I cannot conceive of a
valid legislative purpose under our Constitution for a state law
which makes the color of a person's skin the test of whether his
conduct is a criminal offense.... And I think it is simply not
possible for a state law to be valid under our Constitution which
makes the criminality of an act depend upon the race of the ac-
tor. Discrimination of that kind is invidious per se.2
This is an important debate in its own right, but had the discussion
been limited to the appropriate standard of review in race cases, Loving
would not have been the focus of a conference on the "politics of mar-
riage." It is the new analytical category introduced in Part II of Loving -
the "right to marry" - that brings us here.
We do not know why the Court chose to use Loving to expound its
views on the importance of "the right to marry." We do know, however,
that its characterization of a couple's interest in contracting a marriage is
an important one. The existence of such a liberty interest under the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment makes it possible for the
Court to review any state statute that allegedly imposes a burden on that
interest. By classifying the "right to marry" as "fundamental," the Court
also selects the applicable rule of decision - the same "balancing" analy-
sis commonly applied in cases involving "fundamental rights."
In Loving, the Court's characterization has two primary effects. The
20. See Sullivan, supra note 6, at 293-94.
21. This hypothetical, but unlikely, possibility gave rise to Professor Gerald Gun-
ther's aphorism: "'strict' in theory and fatal in fact." Gerald Gunther, Foreword- In Search of
Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV.
L. REv. 1, 8 (1972).
22. McLaughlin, 379 U.S. at 198 (Stewart & Douglas, JJ., concurring) (footnote and
citations omitted).
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most obvious one is that the "strength" of the right to marry weighs
heavily in the "balance" struck against anti-miscegenation laws. What-
ever interest a state might have been able to assert would pale in signifi-
cance when compared to one of our most basic social institutions.
The second effect was precedential. By recognizing a "right to marry"
as an aspect of liberty under the Due Process Clause, the Court also
made a jurisdictional point about family law. Henceforth, the Court
would be willing, at least in theory, to develop substantive federal con-
straints on the family law powers of the States.2'
Both of these effects illustrate another basic point about characteriza-
tion: as a rational process, it necessarily involves consideration of the im-
plications of the judicial task.
Categorization is often balancing; it requires deciding which
category to put things in, and that is often done by noticing the
consequences and deciding (often subconsciously) if they are
tolerable, better, or worse than certain alternatives.
In Loving, the majority used both characterization and balancing as
explicit devices to make several points about American constitutional
law, the legal and moral repugnance of racial discrimination, and the im-
portance of the marriage relationship. Those points have become the
legacy of Loving.
The title of the conference-Law and the Politics of Marriage: Loving
v. Virginia After 30 Years-was chosen in ordei to highlight the political
context and dimensions of the case, both in 1967 and today. The decision
in Loving represents the federal government's belated judgment that
the Nation should no longer tolerate the eugenic racism embodied in
Virginia's anti-miscegenation statute, its commitment to a "flexible" ap-
proach in deciding cases involving government-sponsored racial dis-
crimination, and its willingness to exercise oversight jurisdiction in mat-
ters involving marriage and family.
Had Loving been decided on the relatively inflexible nondiscrimina-
tion grounds suggested by Justice Stewart, the content of our conference
would have been very different; but the Court did not opt for certainty.
23. See Barber v. Barber, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 582, 584 (1859); see generally Anthony B.
UlIman, Note, The Domestic Relations Exception to Diversity Jurisdiction, 83 COLUM. L.
REV. 1824 (1983).
24. See Gottlieb, supra note 6, at 846 (footnote omitted).
25. The anti-miscegenation law involved in Loving was adopted in 1924, but its his-
torical pedigree dates to 1691. See infra note 39. Of the States that had adopted anti-
miscegenation statutes, California was the first to hold that they were unconstitutional. See
Perez v. Lippold, 198 P.2d 17 (1948).
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As it has in many other race cases, the Court in Loving opted for flexi-
bility. Our conference, therefore, set out to examine what was said in
Loving and how it should be understood in today's debates over law and
the politics of marriage.
The Latin axiom, Quidquid recipitur ad modum recipientis recipitur
("What is received is received according to the mode of the receiver.")
was particularly relevant in planning a conference commemorating the
thirtieth anniversary of Loving. Present-day judges, advocates, and
scholars must interpret the "meaning" of the Court's decision whenever
it arguably is relevant to the issues before them. As such, they - and you
- are the "receivers" of whatever message the Court sought to send.
Today's judges, advocates, and scholars use the case, and the rules it
announced, as precedent. It has become a tool used to shape the future
course and direction of marriage and family law. Given this background,
we thought it appropriate to assume at the outset that much of what we
know as family law is, and has always been, the result of an ongoing de-
bate about "law and the politics of marriage." We hope that the papers
presented here, and in the BYU Journal of Public Law and the Howard
Law Journal, will provide some new insights into that age-old debate.
B. Characterizing the Holding: What Did the Court Decide in Loving?
In order to determine the actual "holding" in Loving, it will be neces-
sary to identify the parts of the opinion that appear to be controlling.
Part I of the decision concludes with the observation that "there can be
no doubt that restricting the freedom to marry solely because of racial
classifications violates the central meaning of the Equal Protection
Clause." 6 This looks like a fairly standard "equal protection" analysis.
Had the Court stopped with these words, Loving would be a clear exam-
ple of a "race" case.
The Court, however, did not end its analysis at this point. Part II of the
decision holds that:
These statutes also deprive the Lovings of liberty without due
process of law in violation of the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. The freedom to marry has long been
recognized as one of the vital personal rights essential to the
orderly pursuit of happiness by free men.... Under our Consti-
tution, the freedom to marry or not marry, a person of another
race resides with the individual and cannot be infringed by the
26. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967).
1216 [Vol. 47:1207
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State."
Which rationale states "the rule" of Loving? The issue is important
because it drives both the characterization of the precedent, and the mes-
sage "received" and applied by courts, scholars and advocates.
If Loving is a race case and the discussion of the "the freedom to
marry or not marry" merely adds weight to the equal protection holding,
the Court's remarks about marriage are not so significant. Like a gener-
alized discussion of the community's interest in assuring nondiscrimina-
tory access to safe and affordable housing in a housing discrimination
case, the discussion of marriage in Loving can be read as underscoring
the intensely personal nature of the damage inflicted on Mr. and Mrs.
Loving. The Court has indicated on many occasions that marriage is an
important relationship, but generalized statements concerning the impor-
tance of marriage would not necessarily provide the basis for federal
oversight of State laws governing marriage, divorce, and child custody.
If, however, Loving announces a dual holding, the analysis is different.
Part II of the opinion deals with the Court's understanding of the con-
cept of "liberty" protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. If it is an independent ground for the Court's decision, it
then becomes necessary to determine the level of generality at which to
characterize the liberty under consideration.
The Court's formulation of that liberty was that "the freedom to marry
or not marry, a person of another race resides with the individual and
cannot be infringed by the State." This formulation can be read in two
ways:
1. As a statement that the "freedom to marry" protected by the Due
Process Clause may not be abridged by discrimination that is either
irrational, or otherwise forbidden by the Constitution; or
2. As a statement that the "freedom to marry" protected by the Due
Process Clause is an individual liberty interest that "resides with
the individual and cannot be infringed by the State."
Read in light of the racial classification involved in Loving, the first
reading would be a more limited conception of the Due Process right. In
this interpretation, the "freedom to marry" recognized by the Court
would not be a generalized right to marry anyone, under any circum-
stances, but one that is bounded by otherwise rational restrictions that
define the nature, incidents, and duration of the marital relationship.
If the holding in Loving is read at a higher level of generality - that is,
without regard to the caveat "of another race" - the result is a far more
27. Id.
1998] 1217
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flexible characterization of the liberty interest. If "the freedom to marry
or not marry, a person resides with the individual and cannot be in-
fringed by the State," all State policies alleged to impose an undue bur-
den on that liberty are (or should be) subject to a balancing test. Such a
liberty interest would then become a powerful tool for the "reform" of
the myriad laws and rules that govern the nature of marriage, divorce,
cohabitation, and sexual relationships.
An Introduction such as this one is no place to attempt a resolution of
these questions. My task is to explain the questions discussed during the
conference, and to highlight briefly the ways in which the papers printed
as a part of this symposium seek to answer them.
II. THE PURPOSE OF THE CONFERENCE AND SYMPOSIUM
The purpose of the Conference was to provide historical, legal, and in-
terdisciplinary background to scholars and practitioners who are inter-
ested in the ways that courts, advocates, and scholars use the Court's
holding in Loving v. Virginia.
A review of the case law, briefs, and scholarship paints a rather clear
picture of the importance of the case. A "right to marry," conceived
broadly as a substantive due process right of "marital"2 or "intimate"29
association, would provide a significant basis for federal oversight of
State power to define, regulate, and order sexual, marital, and family re-
lationships."
28. The term was first used by the United States Supreme Court in Sosna v. Iowa, 419
U.S. 393, 419 (1975) (Marshall & Brennan, JJ., dissenting).
29. The term "intimate association" appears also to have been coined by Professor
Karst. Kenneth L. Karst, The Freedom of Intimate Association, 89 YALE L.J. 624, 629-47
(1980) (arguing that the freedom to create, maintain, and terminate intimate associations
is a necessary component of a meaningful right to privacy). It is broader than the right to
"marital association" because it includes relationships that do not depend on marital
status. The early literature utilizing the term focused on extending the concept of "marital
association" to homosexual relationships. See id. (arguing that the right to marry be ex-
tended to homosexuals); Jeffrey G. Sherman, Undue Influence and the Homosexual Tes-
tator, 42 U. PIrr. L. REV. 225 (1981); Marjorie Maguire Shultz, Contractual Ordering of
Marriage: A New Model for State Policy, 70 CALIF. L. REV. 204 (1982); Catherine E.
Blackburn, Comment, Human Rights in an International Context: Recognizing the Right of
Intimate Association, 43 OHIO ST. L.J. 143 (1982). More recently, the term "intimate asso-
ciation" has been utilized to make the case for broader constitutional protection of the
rights of parents vis A vis the state. See generally David Fisher, Note, Parental Rights and
the Right to Intimate Association, 48 HASTINGS L.J. 399, 400 (1997).
30. See Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978); Moore v. City of East Cleveland,
431 U.S. 494 (1977); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 452-55 (1972); Griswold v. Con-
necticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); cf. United States Dep't of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528
(1973). But see Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986); Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas,
416 U.S. 1 (1974).
[Vol. 47:12071218
Law and the Politics Of Marriage
The "narrower" reading of Loving-that it is, first and foremost, a case
that affirms the inherent irrationality of the concept of "race"-has not
received nearly as much attention. "Race" is a concept much-discussed in
the literature. Though there is considerable difference of opinion, most
contemporary scholarship assumes that the construct has some meaning,
and all agree that, however it is defined, the idea of "race" has social sig-
nificance.31 The thirtieth anniversary of Loving thus presented us with an
opportunity to explore the concept of "race" and its relationship to the
law and politics of marriage and family.
A. Eugenics: Regulating Marriage and Family to Assure Racial Purity
The first and most obvious way to characterize Loving is as a "race"
case. The racial basis for the law was clear on its face:
If any white person intermarry with a colored person, or any
colored person intermarry with a white person, he shall be
guilty of a felony and shall be punished by confinement in the
penitentiary for not less than one nor more than five years. 2
America's long-standing fixation on "race" as a means of organizing
and defending social hierarchy has its roots in religion. Before the voy-
ages of Columbus, the concept of race was used to distinguish among
Christians, Jews, and Pagans (i.e. the "Christian race", or the "Pagan
races"). The concept of race-as-color developed in the early 1500s when
British and Dutch slave traders, condemned on religious grounds by the
Vatican, developed a post hoc Biblical defense for their actions.33 That
justification became the basis for the United States Supreme Court's
31. See generally R. Richard Banks, The Color of Desire: Fulfilling Adoptive Parents'
Racial Preferences Through Discriminatory State Action, 107 YALE L.J. 875 (1998); Der-
rick Bell, Racial Realism, 24 CONN. L. REV. 363 (1992); Robert S. Chang, Toward an
Asian-American Legal Scholarship: Critical Race Theory, Post-Structuralism, and Narra-
tive Space, 81 CALIF. L. REV. 1241, 1266-67 (1993); Jerome McCristal Culp, Jr., Toward a
Black Legal Scholarship: Race and Original Understandings, 1991 DUKE L.J. 39; see also
generally Deborah Hellman, Two Types of Discrimination: The Familiar and the Forgotten,
86 CALIF. L. REV. 315 (1998) (distinguishing between "proxy" and "non-proxy" discrimi-
nation).
32. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 4 (1967) (quoting the Code of Virginia §20-59).
33. One justification was that "'the Negro was a heathen and a barbarian, an outcast
among the peoples of the earth, a descendant of Noah's son Ham, cursed by God himself
and doomed to be a servant forever"' because of the sin of looking upon his father's na-
kedness. DON E. FEHRENBACHER, THE DRED SCOTT CASE: ITS SIGNIFICANCE IN
AMERICAN LAW AND POLITICS 12 (1978); accord, D. Marvin Jones, "We're All Stuck
Here for a While": Law and the Social Construction of the Black Male, 24 J. CONTEMP. L.
35, 72-73 (1998); see generally 6 THE BIBLICAL AND "SCIENTIFIC" DEFENSE OF
SLAVERY: RELIGION AND "THE NEGRO PROBLEM" (John David Smith ed., 1993).
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holding, in Dred Scott v. Sandford,4 that persons of African descent
were:
beings of an inferior order, and altogether unfit to associate
with the white race, either in social or political relations; and so
far inferior, that they had no rights which the white man was
bound to respect; and that the negro [sicl might justly and law-
fully be reduced to slavery for his benefit.
By the end of the Nineteenth Century, the alleged Biblical justification
for racial differences was replaced by the pseudo-sciences of Social Dar-
winism and eugenics." Arguing that there was a "scientific" basis for ob-
servable physical, economic, and cultural differences among nationality
groups, eugenics advocates urged Congress and the State legislatures to
adopt legislation designed to protect Whites from "defective germ
plasm."37 Virginia responded on March 20, 1924 by adopting "The
Eugenical Sterilization Act,"3 and the "Virginia Racial Integrity Act."39
The Loving Court, however, did not hold that Virginia's foray into the
fever swamps of racial eugenics was irrational ab initio because it had no
biological significance. It did not discuss the fact that the social "mean-
ing" of "race" depends on historical and cultural context.4 It would take
34. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856).
35. Id. at 407.
36. See Emily Field Van Tassel, "Only the Law Would Rule Between Us": Antimisce-
genation, The Moral Economy of Dependency, and the Debate Over Rights After the Civil
War, 70 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 873 (1995).
37. See infra note 42.
38. Paul A. Lombardo, Medicine, Eugenics, and the Supreme Court: From Coercive
Sterilization to Reproductive Freedom, 13 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 1, 6 & n.28
(citing the Eugenical Sterilization Act, Act of March 20, 1924 ch. 394 1924 Va. Acts
569-70). The Eugenical Sterilization Act was challenged-and upheld-in Buck v. Bell,
274 U.S. 200 (1927). Oklahoma passed a similar statute in 1935, naming it the "Habitual
Criminal Sterilization Act." Id. at 6 & n.33 (citing the Sterilization of Habitual Criminals,
1935 Okla. Sess. Laws ch. 26, art. I). The Court invalidated this statute on equal protection
grounds in Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942). Buck v. Bell has not been overruled.
See generally Eric M. Jaegers, Note, Modern Judicial Treatment of Procreative Rights of
Developmentally Disabled Persons: Equal Rights to Procreation and Sterilization, 31 U.
LOUISVILLE J. FAM. L. 947 (1992).
39. Lombardo, supra note 37, at 6 & n.28 (citing the Virginia Racial Integrity Act,
Act of March 20, 1924 ch. 371, 1924 Va. Acts 534). Virginia's laws against interracial mar-
riage, however, have a much longer pedigree. As early as 1681, Virginia punished interra-
cial marriage by banishing the white person involved in the marriage. Interracial fornica-
tion was punishable as well. See Stephen A. Siegel, The Federal Government's Power to
Enact Color-Conscious Laws: An Originalist Inquiry, 92 Nw. U. L. REV. 477, 499 n. 132
(1998).
40. There is a considerable body of literature discussing the influence of eugenics on
the Court's jurisprudence. See generally Lombardo, supra note 37; see also Mary L. Dud-
ziak, Oliver Wendell Holmes as a Eugenic Reformer: Rhetoric in the Writing of Constitu-
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twenty years - until 1987 - for the Court even to address the legal
"meaning" of the concept of "race."'" The Loving Court focused instead
on the obvious. The express purpose of Virginia's anti-miscegenation law
was to safeguard the alleged "purity" of the white "race" alone. The al-
leged "purity" of other races was not, for obvious reasons, a matter of
concern to the 1924 Virginia legislature.
Viewed as a race/eugenics case, the teachings of Loving are clear: Mr.
& Mrs. Loving were the victims of a eugenics policy designed to keep
them from reproducing mixed-race children•.4 Two questions follow from
tional Law, 71 IOWA L. REV. 833 (1986) (discussing Holmes' support of eugenics); Yosal
Rogat, Mr. Justice Holmes: A Dissenting Opinion, 15 STAN. L. REV. 254, 282-91 (1963).
Rogat noted that Holmes' maintained "intense eugenicist views." Id at 282.
41. See Saint Francis College v. AI-Khazraji, 481 U.S. 604 (1987) (inquiring whether
42 U.S.C. § 1981 applies to a person of Arabian descent); Shaare Tefila Congregation v.
Cobb, 481 U.S. 615 (1987) (inquiring whether 42 U.S.C. § 1982 applies to persons of Jew-
ish ancestry).
42. The American eugenics movement was mirrored in Europe by the Nazi eugenics
program, and shared many of its pseudo-scientific views concerning the "integrity" of in-
dividuals of Nordic extraction. Paul Lombardo has written that:
The Federal Immigration Restriction Act of 1924 was adopted in the banner year
in the history of the American eugenics movement. The Act's major provisions
were crafted by Harry Laughlin, and prominent eugenicists advocated its pas-
sage. The law was meant to combat the "rising tide of defective germ-plasm"
carried by suspect groups migrating from Southern and Eastern Europe, most
notably Jews and Italians. The eugenicists thought these immigrants would
threaten public morality, poison the "American" gene pool, and were "liable to
become ... public charge[s]." The Act was signed by President Calvin Coolidge,
whose commentary in favor of such laws echoed eugenic rhetoric: "America must
be kept American [because] [b]iological laws show ... that Nordics deteriorate
when mixed with other races." The eugenic intent of the Act, and the national
origins quota system it enforced, remained in place until they were repealed by
the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965.
Lombardo, supra note 37, at 5-6 (quoting, among other sources, Frances Hassencahl
Ph.D., Harry H. Laughlin, 'Expert Eugenics Agent' for the House Committee on Immigra-
tion and Naturalization, 1921-1931 (1970) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Case Western
Reserve University)).
Like their Nazi counterparts, American eugenics advocates branded minorities and per-
sons with developmental disabilities as genetically undesirable, "socially inadequate and a
constant menace to the white race and society at large." Barbara L. Bernier, Class, Race,
and Poverty: Medical Technologies and Socio-Political Choices, 11 HARV. BLACK LETTER
J. 115, 130 (1994) (citing ELAINE ELLIS, STERILIZATION: A MENACE TO THE NEGRO 155
(1937)).
The Supreme Court's preference for the cultural and religious traditions of Northern
and Western Europe mirrored the public sentiments that eventually led to the adoption of
the Immigration Restriction Act. See Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. (8 Otto) 145, 164
(1878) (upholding polygamy conviction, and noting that "[p]olygamy ha[d] always been
odious among the northern and western nations of Europe, and, until the establishment of
the Mormon Church, was almost exclusively a feature of the life of Asiatic and of African
people").
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this observation.
The first is whether the link between Loving and reproduction limits
or broadens what has become known in the literature as "The Loving
Analogy." The second is the nature and extent of the "right to marry"
recognized in Part II of Loving. I will explore "The Loving Analogy" in
Part II.B below. Part II.C is devoted to a brief discussion of the "right to
marry."
B. Exploring the "Loving Analogy"
The second possible characterization of Loving classifies it as a case
involving either privacy, sexuality, or "intimate association." So charac-
terized, the case has significance beyond the fields of race relations and
marriage law.
The basic purpose of Virginia's anti-miscegenation law was to foster
racial "purity" among "whites." Although the social segregation of the
races was the primary device for maintaining racial hegemony,43 controls
on the reproductive behavior of consenting adults underscored the im-
portance Virginia attached to racial "purity." Courts and commentators
therefore place Loving in the line of cases dealing with sexual and repro-
ductive issues that began with Griswold v. Connecticut.4
On the surface, Loving and McLaughlin v. Florida appear to have
much in common with Griswold and Eisenstadt v. Baird. Both Loving
and Griswold involved married couples. Like Eisenstadt, McLaughlin
was a case involving unmarried persons. But the grim reality of racial
politics made it clear that the purpose of both statutes was to criminalize
conduct that would increase the likelihood of a sexual relationship. Sex-
ual contact was not a necessary element of the "crimes" alleged to have
been committed in either Loving or McLaughlin. Neither case would,
therefore, seem to add much weight to the Griswold-Eisenstadt line of
precedent.
A number of commentators have argued, however, that Loving does,
in fact, require stricter scrutiny of laws regulating adult sexual behavior.
Noting that the Virginia statute involved in Loving was designed to fos-
43. See Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896) (upholding as constitutional a segre-
gation statute).
44. 381 U.S. 479 (1965); see generally Carey v. Population Services, 431 U.S. 678
(1977) (extending Griswold's reasoning to minors); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (ex-
tending Griswold to include abortion); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (extending
the holding in Griswold to unmarried persons). But see Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S.
110 (1989) (refusing to extend the reasoning of Griswold to cases involving children con-
ceived during marriage by unfaithful spouses).
[Vol. 47:12071222
Law and the Politics Of Marriage
ter the social subordination of an entire class of citizens, a number of
commentators have argued that the racial animus displayed in Loving
has its analog in laws prohibiting homosexual sexual activities. According
to this view, the refusal of State authorities to provide official sanction to
same-sex relationships is a direct result of invidious discrimination
against homosexuals. These arguments form the basis of what has be-
come known as "The Loving Analogy."
Until recently, most state and federal courts have been reluctant to ex-
tend the reasoning and result in Griswold and Eisenstadt to cases in-
volving consensual homosexual activity.45 In Bowers v. Hardwick,4 the
United States Supreme Court refused to accept the argument altogether.
Controversial from the start, there has been considerable debate in the
literature over the validity of "The Loving Analogy." One goal of the
conference and the symposium was to provide a forum where that debate
could continue.
First identified by Professor Andrew Koppelman in his student note
entitled The Miscegenation Analogy: Sodomy Law as Sex Discrimina-
tion,47 the argument is that "Loving demonstrated the unsoundness" of
the Court's refusal in Bowers to give equal credence to consensual het-
erosexual and homosexual activity. Koppelman argued that:
miscegenation laws discriminated on the basis of race, and they
did so in order to maintain white supremacy. Similarly, sodomy
laws discriminate on the basis of sex-for example, permitting
men, but not women, to have sex with women-in order to im-
pose traditional sex roles. The Court has deemed this purpose
impermissible in other contexts because it perpetuates the sub-
ordination of women. The same concern applies with special
force to the sodomy laws, because their function is to maintain
the polarities of gender on which the subordination of women
depends. Thus, if the Court is to maintain the commitment to
equality that has animated the equal protection jurisprudence
of the past thirty-five years, it cannot uphold the sodomy laws
and was wrong to do so in Bowers.... 4'
45. See, e.g., Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (finding that there was no
fundamental right to engage in sodomy).
46. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
47. 98 YALE L.J. 145 (1988).
48. Koppelman, supra note 47, at 147. In a footnote to his opinion in Bowers, Justice
Blackmun observed that
The parallel between Loving and this case is almost uncanny. There, too, the
State relied on a religious justification for its law .... There, too, defenders of
the challenged statute relied heavily on the fact that when the Fourteenth
Amendment was ratified, most of the States had similar prohibitions .... There,
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Just as miscegenation was threatening because it called into
question the distinctive and superior status of being white, ho-
mosexuality is threatening because it calls into question the dis-
tinctive and superior status of being male.49
Professor William Eskridge has adapted and refined Koppelman's po-
sition. He draws a direct analogy between the anti-miscegenation laws
invalidated in Loving and the legitimacy of recognizing (or refusing to
recognize) same-sex unions as "marriages." Eskridge argues, in essence,
that Loving overruled Virginia's ban on interracial marriage because the
classification was based on an ideology of white supremacy. In his view,
anti-miscegenation laws were rejected as standing in contradiction with
the purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment. Courts should therefore
overrule bans on the recognition of same-sex unions as "marriages" be-
cause the classifications on which they are based rest on sexist and het-
erosexist ideologies. These ideologies too, he believes, are contradicted
by the Fourteenth Amendment's purpose."
In a more recent submission, Professors Eskridge and Sheila Rose Fos-
ter argue that the use of the "Loving Analogy" has strategic importance:
We make the race analogies because of Loving. We make
the sex analogies because that's the way you connect Loving
with the equal rights amendment in Hawaii. We also make the
religion analogy. Typically, the traditionalist response to race
and sex is that those are immutable and that sexual orientation
is chosen. I think all three of those categories are mutable and
none of the three of them are chosen in any conscious (or sub-
conscious) way. But I think the important analogy among race,
sex, sexual orientation and religion, if we look at them as a clus-
ter, is that they are irrational classifications. When they are used
to segregate people or to penalize people, that our traditional
reason for that has been prejudice, then the result of that has
been unproductive anger and empowering society's worst peo-
ple; people who are bigots. And I think that's more the message
too, at the time the case came before the Court, many of the States still had
criminal statutes concerning the conduct at issue .... Yet the Court held, not
only that the invidious racism of Virginia's law violated the Equal Protection
Clause, but also that the law deprived the Lovings of due process by denying
them the "freedom of choice to marry" that had "long been recognized as one of
the vital personal rights essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free
men."
Bowers, 478 U.S. at 211 n. 5 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
49. Koppelman, supra note 47 at 159-60.
50. See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., THE CASE FOR SAME-SEX MARRIAGE at 159-
61 (1996); see also David Orgon Coolidge, Essay, Same-Sex Marriage? Baehr v. Miike and
the Meaning of Marriage, 38 S. TEX. L. REV. 1 (1997) (discussing the Eskridge position).
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to make.
It seems to me also that when you make these sort of analo-
gies, you are trying to destabilize the status quo. People say,
"you can't have same-sex marriage," and you remind them to
think about thirty or forty years ago. Forty years ago in West
Virginia, where I grew up, it was UNTHINKABLE for a differ-
ent-race couple to marry.... The point to be made from that is
the "constructedness" of marriage, and lines for cordoning peo-
ple off within marriage. One reason we play the race card or re-
ligion card or sex card is to remind people that none of this is
written in stone. It's not like the Ten Commandments. Go back
and read them. They don't forbid same-sex marriage. There's
no natural law principle against it. Look at how marriage as an
institution has evolved, even within our lifetimes. It seems an-
other reason why we want to play these kinds of cards."
The analogies drawn between Loving, Bowers, and discrimination on
the basis of sex and religion are controversial. They are also influential.
The Hawaii Supreme Court explicitly relied on the "Loving Analogy" in
Baehr v. Lewin. 2
Noting that "constitutional law may mandate, like it or not, that cus-
toms change with an evolving social order,"53 the Hawaii court held that
the State's refusal to issue marriage licenses to same-sex couples should
be viewed as discrimination "on the basis of sex" unless a compelling
state interest for the State's position could be demonstrated; a burden
the State failed to meet.
Given the importance of "the Loving Analogy" to the debate over the
recognition of same-sex unions as "marriages," several presentations
were devoted to a discussion of the importance of Loving in that context.
Among the papers on this topic were David Orgon Coolidge's submis-
sion, Playing the Loving Card, Same-Sex Marriage and the Politics of
Analogy,54 Richard F. Duncan's From Loving to Roemer: Homosexual
Marriage and Moral Discernment.5 Professors Peter Lubin and Dwight
Duncan provide an historical perspective on the debate in Follow the
51. William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Sheila Rose Foster, Remarks, Discussion Same-Sex
Marriage, 7 TEMP. POL. & Civ. RTS. L. REV. 329,333-334 (1998).
52. 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993), reconsideration granted in part by, 875 P.2d 225 (Haw.
1993); and on appeal after remand Baehr v. Miike, 910 P.2d 112 (Haw. 1996); on remand
NO. CIV. 91-1394, 1996 WL 694235 (Hawai'i Cir. Ct., Dec. 3, 1996), order affd 950 P.2d
1234 (Haw. 1997) (table).
53. Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d at 63.
54. 12 BYU J. PUB. L. 201 (1998).
55. 12 BYU J. PUB. L. 239 (1998).
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Footnote, or the Advocate as Historian.56
C. Current Developments in the Law of Marriage and Family: The
Enduring Importance of Loving in Marriage, Divorce, Adoption, and
Child-Custody Cases
The last way to characterize Loving is as a "marriage" case. This char-
acterization has significance in three distinct areas: marriage, divorce,
and matters of child custody.
1. Marriage & Divorce
In Part II of Loving, the Court makes reference to "the freedom to
marry," noting that it "has long been recognized as one of the vital per-
sonal rights essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men."57
This characterization of the Loving precedent raises an important feder-
alism question. What limit does the "freedom to marry" impose on the
discretion of the States to define the nature, obligations, incidents, and
duration of the marital relationship?
The question is formulated in this manner for a simple reason. Legisla-
tive jurisdiction over matters of domestic relations and family law are
among the powers reserved to the States. Federal oversight of State
lawmaking authority must derive, if at all, from either the Fourteenth
Amendment, or another provision of the Constitution that grants law-
making authority to Congress.
There is no question that the Fourteenth Amendment is the source of
the Court's statement in Loving that "the freedom to marry, or not
marry.., resides with the individual and cannot be infringed by the
56. 48 CATH. U. L. REV. 1271 (1998).
57. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967).
58. In Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 734-735 (1878), the Court stated that a State
"has the absolute right to prescribe the conditions upon which the marriage relation be-
tween its own citizens shall be created, and the causes for which it may be dissolved." This
division of authority has a long pedigree, and was affirmed as recently as 1995. See United
States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 564 (1995) (rejecting the proposition that the Commerce
Clause might support a finding of federal legislative jurisdiction over "family law (includ-
ing marriage, divorce, and child custody)").
Read together with the "domestic relations" exception to federal diversity jurisdiction,
see generally supra note 23 and sources cited therein, the role of the federal courts in mat-
ters of family law was minimal. Until Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), the
Court rarely exercised federal oversight jurisdiction in family law matters, and, when it
did, it generally affirmed the existence of State power.
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State." 9 In Zablocki v. Redhail,6° the Court places Loving in the line of
"privacy" cases that begins with Griswold, and describes it as "[t]he
leading decision of this Court on the right to marry."61 As a result, it is
arguable that all State regulations that "significantly interfere with deci-
sions to enter into the marital relationship" should be subjected to "rig-
orous scrutiny."
The federal case law, however, has been far from clear on this point. In
some instances, the United States Supreme Court describes marriage as
"the most important relation in life."62 In divorce cases, however, mar-
riage is viewed as a "status," thus allowing the state of the domicile of
one party to dissolve the legal relationship without first having to dem-
onstrate that it has jurisdiction over both of the parties to the action.63
Even though marriage is said to be "the foundation of the family and of
society, without which there would be neither civilization nor progress, ' 4
the marriage relationship - once contracted - has less protection than the
partners' interests in property or child custody.65
The Court, in fact, has not been clear concerning either the nature of
the "right to marry," or the degree to which it will intervene to override
state policy in this sensitive area of law. In Sosna v. Iowa,66 for example,
the Court reaffirmed its longstanding position regarding the "compre-
hensive statutory regulation of domestic relations, an area that has long
been regarded as a virtually exclusive province of the States., 67 Just two
years later, however, in Zablocki, the Court invalidated a Wisconsin
statute that required court approval before a marriage license could be
issued to any "Wisconsin resident having minor issue not in his custody
and which he is under obligation to support by any court order or judg-
59. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967).
60. 434 U.S. 374 (1978).
61. Id. at 383 (1978).
62. Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190,205 (1888).
63. See Williams v. North Carolina (I), 317 U.S. 287 (1942); see also Bell v. Bell, 181
U.S. 175 (1901) (holding that actual good faith domicile of at least one party is essential to
confer authority and jurisdiction on the courts of a state to render a decree of divorce that
will be entitled to extraterritorial effect under the Full Faith and Credit Clause); cf An-
drews v. Andrews, 188 U.S. 14 (1903) (same, even if both parties personally appear).
64. Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190,211 (1888).
65. See May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528 (1953) (child custody); Estin v. Estin, 334 U.S.
541 (1948) (requiring personal jurisdiction for adjustment of property interests); Interna-
tional Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (requiring "minimum contacts"
with the State to be subject to "in personam" jurisdiction).
66. 419 U.S. 393 (1975).
67. Id. at 404.
68. See Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 375 (citing WIs. STAT. §§ 245.10(1), (4), (5) (1973)).
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ment." In the Court's view, conditioning receipt of a marriage license on
proof that the non-custodial parent had complied with all support obliga-
tions, and that his or her children "[were] not then and [were] not likely
thereafter to become public charges" was a violation of the Equal Protec-
tion Clause.69
The connection between Loving and contemporary disputes over the
nature and character of marriage and family was the primary focus of the
conference because there have been a number of recent developments
that call the meaning of Loving into question. A series of federal and
state cases raise important questions concerning the right to marry."
Legislative developments regarding divorce reform7 and "covenant mar-
riage"72 also make it clear that the debate over state power in the field of
marriage and family is far from over.
Four of the papers presented in this symposium discuss the constitu-
tional status of marriage: Katherine Shaw Spaht's, Beyond Baehr
69. Id.
70. Compare Shahar v. Bowers, 114 F.3d 1097 (11th Cir. 1997) (rejecting the conten-
tion that there is a "right to marry" a person of the same sex), and In re Ladrach, 32 Ohio
Misc.2d 6, 513 N.E.2d 828 (1987) (rejecting an application for a marriage license to allow
postoperative male to female transsexual to marry a male), with Baehr v. Miike, 910 P.2d
112 (Haw. 1996) (accepting the possibility that recognition of same-sex unions may be re-
quired under Hawai'i's equal rights amendment), and Brause v. Bureau of Vital Statistics,
No. 3AN-95-6562 CI, 1998 WL 88743, at *3 (D. Alaska, Feb 27, 1998) (holding that the
state must "have a compelling purpose before it can define marriage to exclude partners
of the same sex").
71. Theodore F. Haas, The Rationality and Enforceability of Contractual Restrictions
on Divorce, 66 N.C. L. REV. 879 (1988); Maura I. Strassberg, Distinctions of Form or Sub-
stance: Monogamy, Polygamy and Same-Sex Marriage, 75 N.C. L. REV. 1501 (1997); Laura
Bradford, Note, The Counterrevolution: A Critique of Recent Proposals to Reform No-
Fault Divorce Laws, 49 STAN. L. REV. 607 (1997); Robert M. Gordon, Note, The Limits of
Limits on Divorce, 107 YALE L.J. 1435 (1998); Jodi M. Solovy, Comment, Civil Enforce-
ment of Jewish Marriage and Divorce: Constitutional Accommodation of a Religious Man-
date, 45 DEPAUL L. REV. 493 (1996).
72. See LA. REV. STAT. §§ 9:224-:225, :234, :245, :272-:275, :307-:309, and LA. CIV.
CODE arts. 102-103 (West 1991 & Supp. 1998). The Louisiana covenant marriage allows
unilateral divorce only for fault or after a lengthy separation. Divorce cannot be granted
except on the fault grounds provided in the statute. See LA. REV. STAT. Ann. § 9:307. LA.
REV. ST. §9-272 defines "covenant marriage" as follows:
A covenant marriage is a marriage entered into by one male and one female who
understand and agree that the marriage between them is a lifelong relationship.
Parties to a covenant marriage have received counseling emphasizing the nature
and purposes of marriage and the responsibilities thereto. Only when there has
been a complete and total breach of the marital covenant commitment may the
non-breaching party seek a declaration that the marriage is no longer legally rec-
ognized.
Id. at § 9:272.
1228
Law and the Politics Of Marriage
Strengthening the Definition of Marriage,73 and Lynne Marie Kohm's,
Liberty and Marriage - Baehr and Beyond: Due Process in 1998;74 Lynn
Wardle, Loving v. Virginia and the Constitutional Right to Marry,75 and
Margaret Brinig, The Supreme Court's Impact on Marriage, 1967-90.76
2. Racism and Family Law: Child Custody, Foster Care, and Adoption
Although the Court has repeatedly reaffirmed its rejection of race-
based classifications for contracting marriage, and has refused to permit
race to be taken into account in child custody controversies, there re-
mains one area where the rationale of Loving appears to have met with
some resistance: transracial adoption.77
Although the issue of transracial adoption was not addressed specifi-
cally at the conference, the papers presented by Dr. Robert A. Pratt,
Professor of History at the University of Georgia, and Prof. Steven Car-
ter addressed the problem of racism in family law.
Dr. Pratt, whose paper appears in the Howard Law Journal,78 was in a
unique position to address this question. Having grown up down the
street from Richard and Mildred Loving's home, Dr. Pratt's remarks
opened the conference with the human and political story behind the
case. Rounding out his remarks were papers by Professor Margaret
Brinig of George Mason University School of Law on The Supreme
Court's Impact on Marriage, 1967-90,"9 and Laurence C. Nolan of How-
ard University, The Meaning of Loving: Marriage, Due Process and
Equal Protection.3 Professor Carl Schneider of the University of Michi-
gan Law School presented useful, but as yet unpublished, remarks on the
relationship between family law and constitutional law.
73. 12 BYU J. PUB. L. 277 (1998).
74. 12 BYU J. PUB. L. 253 (1998).
75. 41 HOw. L.J. (forthcoming Sept. 1998).
76. 41 How. L.J. (forthcoming Sept. 1998).
77. See generally Elizabeth Bartholet, International Adoption: Propriety, Prospects
and Pragmatics, 13 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIM. LAW. 181 (1996); Cynthia G. Hawkins-Leon,
The Indian Child Welfare Act and the African American Tribe: Facing the Adoption Crisis,
36 BRANDEIS J. FAM. L. 201 (1998) (arguing that race and ethnicity should be taken into
account in adoptions); Rebecca Varan, Comment, Desegregating the Adoptive Family: In
Support of the Adoption Antidiscrimination Act of 1995, 30 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 593
(1997) (contra).
78. Crossing the Color Line: A Historical Assessment and Personal Narrative of
Loving v. Virginia, 41 How. L.J. (forthcoming Sept. 1998).
79. See Brinig, supra note 76.
80. 41 How. L.J. (forthcoming Sept. 1998).
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III. CONCLUSION
There is much more that can be said and written about Loving v. Vir-
ginia, and its impact on the present "law and politics of marriage." The
"politics" of marriage and family law is a contemporary issue of signifi-
cant importance - to the United States, and around the world. It was our
hope that we could present at least one paper on the comparative law as-
pects of Loving, and another on the impact that the recognition of a
"right to marry" has on federalism and separation of powers. Two such
papers were presented at the conference," but neither was ready for
publication as these remarks go to press.
We trust that you, the readers of these papers, will find them useful
and informative.
81. See lain T. Benson, Some Canadian Aspects of the Law and Politics of Marriage:
Is There a Principled Pluralistic Response to the Dispute Over Same-sex Recognition?
(1998) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author); Robert A. Destro, Law & The Poli-
tics of Marriage: Judicial Policy Making and Its Impact on the Political Process (1998) (un-
published manuscript, on file with author).
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